; Metaphysical skepticism is the denial of metaphysical knowledge. Nietzsche is well aware of the origins of this argument, as he makes clear in the other half of this notebook fragment (not quoted by Leiter). The best explanation for persistent disagreement (among philosophers) about substantive moral questions, he thinks, is that these questions do not have correct answers. Nietzsche, at least, then has good reason to bite the skeptical bullet about much philosophical disagreement. While there is an extent to which theoretical stances are underdetermining with respect to their practical implications (there are, for example, both lassiez-faire capitalists and near-socialists among those who subscribe to both deontological and utilitarian views about the structure of morality compare Rawls, Nozick, Mill, and Friedman), it is plainly easier to hold some practical positions if one also holds certain theoretical positions. Should we infer from this that there is no fact of the matter as to whether mind/body dualism is true? Later in the same book, Nietzsche notes that moral philosophers make one laugh with their idea of morality as science, their pursuit of a rational foundation for morality, which seen clearly in the light of day is really only a scholarly form of good faith in the dominant morality, a new way of expressing it. Pointing at Schopenhauers attempt to supply a rational foundation for morality, Nietzsche says we can draw our conclusions as to how scientific a science could be when its ultimate masters still talk like children (BGE 186). expresses a moral attitude or acceptance of a moral norm (Ayer, [1936] 1946; Gibbard, 1990; cf. How many who teach ethics classes to undergraduates can recall the smartest and most thoughtful students making early commitments to overarching theoretical frameworks like Kantian or utilitarianism, well before being exposed to anything like the full panoply of arguments against them? However, the error theory does not represent the only way of taking the ubiquity of deep moral disagreement seriously, and drawing a broadly anti-realist conclusion. In fact, to explain how the strangest metaphysical claims of a philosopher really come about, it is always good (and wise) to begin by asking: at what morality does it (does he) aim? The idea is then to show how the expressivist can make sense of talk of moral truth given deflationism. Individual versus Group Disagreement and Their Implications for Moral Relativism. Blackwell Companion to Relativism. This objection seems to rest on the curiously Whiggish assumption that the truth will always reveal itself to sufficiently intelligent and conscientious inquirers. J.L Mackie proposes a. The real provenance-both historical and philosophical-of the argument from disagreement is Skeptical (Pyrrhonian, in fact). In Morality, Reason, and Truth, edited by D. Copp and D. Zimmerman. So, it seems, the Nietzschean argument is effectively telling its opponents that it is an argument that they should simply ignore. He goes on to claim that there is little agreement on the fundamental issues of science, but the examples he gives, in fact, seem to involve metaphysical disputes about science, not debates internal to scientific practice. Suppose that people, even people-philosophers, did tend to converge in moral judgement. ), In his provocative paper, Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement: Developing an Argument from Nietzsche, Brian Leiter argues for the distinctively anti-realist thesis that there are no objective moral truths. Arguments from moral disagreement for some kind of anti-realism have been around for a long time. And if we ask why that should be believed, the answer, I think, is that the paradigm of theory is taken to be the theory in the natural science. In the second case I persisted despite hypocrisy by academics who claimed to share the same principle. what is morally required or to avoid what is morally wrong. Of course I simplify. I just know that x is good. One should keep ones promises, Parents should care for their children, Human beings should not be uses in as mere means, Gods should be worshipped, Wise men should be respected, Beauty should be admired seem to me simply true. Bravo for their philosophy, but their rhetoric deserves a raspberry: both Berkeley and Hume were consummate metaphysicians regardless of the insults they hurl at metaphysics. So the problem is just to explain how it could be that I assign a 40% probability to the philosophical theory T3, and only a 30% probability to the rival theory T1, if in fact the true theory is T1 and not T3. Although this is a central topic in Nietzsches texts, it is neglected both in Nietzsche scholarship and in contemporary moral philosophy. He argued that there seems to be no good reason to affirm any moral proposition, for moral hypotheses are never part of the best explanation of any observation. Brian starts with the following truism: there exist incompatible moral theories, such as Kantianism and Utilitarianism, which provide justifications for incompatible moral propositions. I shall address Leiters argument presently, but let me first note that Im not yet convinced that we should attribute the argument to Nietzsche. Even psychology, the most epistemically robust of the human sciences, managed to make progress: e.g., the repudiation of behaviorism, and the cognitive turn in psychology in just the last fifty years. (For a popular account of this debate, see Holt 2006.) If he does, I wonder how he can continue making normative claims like this on his blog. B. The real significance of the claims of moral philosophers is what they tell us about those who make them for they are a sign-language of the affects (BGE 187), betraying the psychological needs of those who make them. But the conclusions of these analogous arguments are implausible, say the critics, and so we should resist Leiters inference (from disagreement about what the moral facts are to the claim that there are no moral facts) as well. E.g., imagine an objectivist view of moral truths that would be parallel to the view of normative truths that I have defended in my own work (Wedgwood 2007). Im uncertain as to what precisely Leiter means by objective moral facts, but I agree that there are no facts that could settle the disagreements among deontologists, consequentialists, and virtue theorists such that there is a single correct normative theory. The argument might focus either on disagreement about the methodology of moral reasoning, on disagreement in moral belief itself, or more likely on both. (eds. Indeed, he suggests that if there were objectively correct answers to philosophical questions, then rational and well-informed philosophers engaging in sustained philosophical inquiry and reflective contemplation across millennia would have converged on those objectively correct answers. And a prominent candidate explanation involves moral facts together with some (imperfect) ability in us to discover what they are, On the other hand, holding the argument to a standard of total or near total moral disagreement seems unwarranted. not to be an immoral person. Nonetheless, even this much more limited premise is not obviously true. When used, someone's insinuating the topic isn't based on scientific findings and is, therefore, lacking in truth. Is the criterion of right action the reasons for which it is performed or the consequences it brings about? We have to start somewhere. A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackies Moral Error Theory. morally required does not serve the agents interest in any way. So if Leiter wants to argue for full bore skepticism about morality generally, then he needs to address Anscombe, MacIntyre et al. But it is quite conceivable that there are no moral facts (construed as non-negative atomic moral facts). Which Rationality?_ and finally in _Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry_), but of course he deploys Nietzchean arguments in the service of re-establishing a form of moral realism. Thus, it is doubtful whether the basic premise of Nietzschean argument is really true. Similarly, anyone who has ever taught Locke on property knows that, agree with him or not, little of interest there (the law of waste or the proviso, for example) depends on the theistic framework in which it is presented. Surely one possibilitydare I say the most likely possibility?is that those who are professionally invested in normative moral theory as a serious, cognitive disciplinerather than seeing it, as Marxists or Nietzscheans might, as a series of elaborate post-hoc rationalizations for the emotional attachments and psychological needs of certain types of people (bourgeois academics, slavish types of psyches)will resist, with any dialectical tricks at their disposal, the possibility that their entire livelihood is predicated on the existence of ethnographically bounded sociological and psychological artifacts. I think, or at least I hope, that even skeptics like Leiter and realists like myself can agree on the fact that we both cant be right and that one of us is making a mistake: in contrast to the way some relativists see things, both sides of the debate agree that this is not a faultless dispute. Many of his fellow Apostles thought otherwise. In the sciences, foundational propositions would be, e.g., laws of nature in virtue of which particular true predictions are made. Indeed, the particularist can even echo some of Leiters rhetoric, suggesting that it is an occupational hazard of professional philosophers to theorize and articulate principles. Ethical Relativism: the prescriptive view that (1) different groups of people ought to have different ethical standards for evaluating acts as right or wrong, (2) these different beliefs are true in their respective societies, and (3) these different beliefs are not instances of a basic moral principle. (3) There are no moral facts to disagree about. When it comes to a (largely) empirical issue like this, we shouldnt let the tail of theory wag the dog of evidence any more than we have to. Leiter differs from Mackie primarily in emphasizing disagreement amongst professional philosophers as opposed to ordinary people. It is clear that Nietzsche has a higher opinion of Goethe, Napoleon, and Beethoven, than of the rabble and the herd, but much more is needed to show he thinks that judgments about value has any objective standing. The Platonic account can make sense of this experience as reflecting an incompletely corrupted moral faculty, strong enough to identify our moral failings but not strong enough to motivate us to correct them. A Kantian might emphasize duty and so try to theorize ordinary morality in a way a way that distorts ordinary morality, and in turn we might explain that tendency by some strange non-rational bias on her part (I write of course as a humean with Nietzschean sympathies (!)) Reply to Kail: As befits a distinguished Hume scholar with (appropriate!) A few words of explanation. Just as kant, in, Moral Theology, History of (20th-Century Developments), Moral Theology, History of (700 to Vatican Council I), Moral Theology, History of (Contemporary Trends), Morales Bermdez Cerruti, Francisco (1921), https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/moral-skepticism. If, when I ask the same twenty people what color a particular persons aura is, they all give different answers, I have the beginnings of a pretty good reason to doubt, not simply that we can discern what peoples auras are, but that people have auras at all. This passage is representative: It is a very remarkable moment: the Sophists verge upon the first critique of morality, the first insight into morality:they juxtapose the multiplicity (the geographical relativity) of the moral value judgments [Moralischen Werthurtheile];they let it be known that every morality can be dialectically justified; i.e., they divine that all attempts to give reasons for morality are necessarily sophisticala proposition later proved on the grand scale by the ancient philosophers, from Plato onwards (down to Kant);they postulate the first truth that a morality-in-itself [eine Moral an sich], a good-in-itself do not exist, that it is a swindle to talk of truth in this field. Shafer-Landau, Russ. Of course there is much moral disagreement in our societies, but there is much agreement, also. I was still skeptical even after the word "natural" was printed on the food label. For a defense of the view that there are objective moral facts constituted by the partial overlap or convergence of reasonable moral theories see my book (Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice [Oxford, 2010]), Chapters 6 and 7. For before we are entitled to that conclusion, we would have to ask what the best explanation for the meta-disagreement really is? Instead, it asks what, if anything, makes it 219-242. So it is not hard to explain why some philosophers have a somewhat higher degree of confidence in the correctness of their favoured theory than they are rationally entitled to. I have foregone very large amounts of money, with associated reduction in respect, for another. It was questioned, for example, whether one could gain any certain knowledge in metaphysics (the philosophical study of the basic nature, structure, or elements of reality) or in the sciences. 1. There is a sense in which the Sophists would, at any rate, be uneasy partners for Nietzsche if he were out to argue for moral anti-realism, as Leiter would have it. Practical moral skeptics do not deny that there is Although most of our abductive thought experiments end up interpreting our sensory experiences in terms of an external, material world, . Indeed, they claim, Leiters argument is self-defeating, since we could as well argue from disagreement among philosophers about the correctness of Leiters inference to there being no fact about whether Leiters inference is correct. A functioning society needs internalized norms that are widely shared within it (an inference from sociology rather than ethics). A few . by So why doesnt philosophical disagreement about morality support skepticism rather than anti-realism? What is interesting, and perhaps a bit ironic, is that Leiters paper itself suggests the beginnings of a strategy for responding to this very argumenta family of defusing explanations that might apply especially to moral disagreement among philosophers. (No matter for now that the moral realist should be just as capable of making this claim about morality.) Ideal (Oxford: Oxford University Press), Parfit, D. 1984. Religious skeptics question events and specific practices in religions. Encyclopedias almanacs transcripts and maps. It is that there are no objective moral truths at all no objectively true answers to any moral questions whatsoever. Moral Scepticism and moral Disagreement That is, they fail to show what they purport to show, namely, that true moral claims can be derived from some proposition (be it the Kants categorical imperative or the Mills utilitarian principle) that can be doubted only on pains of irrationality. (I am not alone here, at least Joel Kupperman and David Schimdtz think so too.) Such an understanding might require an understanding of emergence phenomena. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. That moral philosophers cannot agree on a justification for how they base their judgments and actions on these facts is an embarrassment to moral philosophy, but not to morality itself. The idea that there are no moral truths, full stop, is perhaps straightforward enough at least, it is not especially obscure for a philosophical thesis. Ayer and Stevenson both thought, of course, that there was lots of serious first-order inquiry to be done about non-moral facts and logic, inquiry which might influence our moral attitudes. For Nietzsche consistently believed in objective orders of rank among human beings. So, if indeed Nietzsche was an error theorist, then Leiters argument from disagreement is not good news for Nietzsche. For example, relative to the perspective of a consequentialist, it is perhaps true that most people in the industrialized West should give more to charity than they actually do. wrong, but it still might never be irrational to do what is morally I dont pretend this argument is decisive. The objective truth is that the streets are not as safe as the office; however, officers ignore this due to their frustration in dealing with management. Chapter 9. But if many people in lots of circumstances get the answer wrong, and get it right only in roughly the same proportions as would be produced by random chance, then we have powerful evidence that we lack epistemic access to facts about the rank and suit of overturned playing cards, and quite likely to other, similar matters as well. will focus on practical moral skepticism about what is morally Explaining the evident and the observable is often an extremely challenging task. (2**) The best explanation of (1**) is not an epistemic deficiency on the part of at least some of the rival philosophers a deficiency which deprives all or most of them of access to the facts but the thesis that there are no facts about the large scale structure of the universe to disagree about. Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege, Ethics, 116: 302- I agree that we have a good reason to be skeptical towards moral theories and just about any other speculative philosophical theory. For example, consider G.E. Big Foot - a larger than life beast in the Pacific Northwest of the U.S. Chupacabra - a blood-sucking animal that attacks livestock. It might be that we know so little about how morality relates to reality that we wouldnt have found a good theory for it by now. Namely, the dispute over whether or not moral sentences express propositions (often described as the cognitivism/non-cognitivism dispute, though semantic factualism/non-factualism is, perhaps, a more accurate description of the dispute). How about this argument (call it L/N**)? Philosophy has, ever since the days of Socrates, had a culture of adversarial debate. Philosophers who accept one of the skeptical doctrines typically try to defuse it. Brian argues that the best explanation of this datum is as follows: (1) There are no objective facts about X propositions, so